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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀects of central bank interventions (CBI) in a noise trad-
ing model with chartists and fundamentalists. We first estimate a model in which chartists
extrapolate past returns and fundamentalists forecast a mean reverting dynamics of the ex-
change rate towards a fundamental value. Then, we investigate the role of central bank in-
terventions for explaining the switching properties between the two types of agents. We find
evidence that in the medium run, interventions increase the proportion of fundamentalists
and therefore exert some stabilzing influence on the exchange rate.
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1 Introduction
Direct interventions in the foreign exchange (FX) market have often been used as a policy instru-
ment by the major central banks . By sterilizing their operations, monetary authorities have used
these interventions as a stabilisation tool independent of monetary policy. While some authorities
like the US Federal Reserve have been increasingly reluctant to use central bank interventions
(CBIs hereafter), other major central banks like the European Central Bank (ECB) or the Bank
of Japan (BoJ) have conducted several rounds of interventions over the last five years. The ECB
carried out four operations in the second part of the year 2000 in order to support the Euro against
the other currencies. During the last decade, the BoJ has been extremely active, intervening in
the market during more than three hundred days with the explicit aim of influencing the dynamics
of the Yen against the USD.
Despite the wide use of direct interventions by the central banks, researchers (as well as policy
makers) have questionned the eﬀectiveness of such an instrument. Within the literature devoted
to the conduct of foreign exchange rate policies, the issue of eﬀectiveness is the one which has
received the greatest attention. Recent surveys provided by Sarno and Taylor (2001) or Humpage
(2003) oﬀer a useful review of this strand of the literature. One problem in assessing whether inter-
ventions have delivered the intended goal is that the objectives followed by the central banks are
rarely known by external researchers. Several possible objectives have been mentioned including
influencing trend movements, reversing past trends, smoothing exchange rate volatility or creating
monetary base through unsterilized operations. While a couple of international agreements like
the Plaza agreement in 1985 and the Louvre agreement in 1987 provide some insight about the
ultimate goal of these interventions, the objectives are likely to change over time and to diﬀer
across central banks. 1
A simple and direct criterion of eﬀectiveness used in the empirical literature is whether the
exchange rate level reacts to the central bank purchases or sales of foreign currency in the in-
tended direction the day of the intervention (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Dominguez, 1998; Beine,
Be´nassy and Lecourt, 2002). The adoption of this criterion stems from the fact that the most fre-
1Lack of transparency in the FX policy is clearly one major source for identifying the explicit goals. The use of
imprecise terms in central bank’s statements also leads to some diﬃculty of interpretation.
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quent objective followed by central banks concerns the dynamics of the first moment of exchange
rate returns. In general, the bulk of the empirical studies found that central bank interventions
did not induce the intended changes in the exchange rate level. Some studies found even some
moderate evidence of perverse results (i.e. currency depreciation following the purchase of this
currency), which is diﬃcult to rationalize (see nevertheless Bhattacharya and Weller, 1997). Quite
recently however, new empirical approaches have provided more support for eﬃciency in the sense
that the exchange rate was found to react significantly (and in the intended direction) to the cen-
tral bank operation. Using intradaily data, Dominguez (2003) as well as Payne and Vitale (2003)
indeed show that such an eﬀect might show up in the very short run, i.e. within a few minutes
after the occurrence of the operations. In a diﬀerent perspective, accounting explicitly for the
simultaneity issue, Kearns and Ribogon (2004) find more promising results at a daily frequency
for the operations carried out by the Bank of Japan and the Reserve Bank of Australia.
While simple and straightforward, the use of this criterion of eﬀectiveness raises two questions.
First, the objective followed by the central bank might be less simple than influencing the level
within the day or the hour of the intervention. For instance, the central bank might be willing to
break a past depreciating or appreciating trend of its currency. In this case, insignificant results
in terms of returns might lead to overemphasizing the poor performance of the operations. To
tackle this point, some authors (Fatum and Hutchison, 2003; Morel and Te¨ıleitche, 2004) have
conducted event studies that allow to introduce more flexibility in terms of the possible objectives
followed by the central bank(s). 2 The second issue is the optimal horizon followed by central
banks. While this horizon might diﬀer across central banks and over time, central bank surveys
(Neely, 2001) tend to show that central banks also care about the developments of the exchange
rate beyond the day of the intervention. Promising outcomes generated by the intervention in
the very short run might thus be meaningless for central bankers if they are reversed later on.
Conversely, the use of successive interventions that might signal commitment of the central bank
to defend the currency (such as the policy followed by the Bank of Japan in 2003 and 2004) might
2While interesting, we do not follow here this kind of approaches that in turn raise some questions about their
implementation. There are in particular two critical issues associated to the use of event studies for assessing the
impact of FX interventions. The first one is the definition of an event and in particular the definition of clustered
operations that should be considered as one single event. The second point concerns the endogeneous definition
of the event. For instance, if a particular central bank keeps intervening until the objective is reached, the use of
event studies might lead to a bias in favour of eﬃciency. Interestingly, this general conclusion turns out to be more
supported by this strand of the literature.
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lead to more favourable results that can be diﬃcult to identify in the (very) short run.
In this paper, we adopt another criterion for eﬃciency of the FX central bank interventions.
We consider a given central bank intervention as eﬃcient if it moves the exchange rate in a
direction consistent with the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate. Central banks often claim
that their interventions aim at restoring the value of exchange rates to a level consistent with the
fundamentals. While central banks pursue other goals, the specific objective of minimizing the
degree of misalignement has been extensively included in loss functions used in theoretical analyses
(see Vitale, 1999 as well as De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2005 among others). The adoption of such
a policy has been advocated by several authors including for instance Neely (2004) claiming that
the central bank should act as a long-term speculator in the FX market. Theoretical analyses such
as De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005) also suggest that central bank interventions might drive the
exchange rate in a direction consistent with fundamentals. In contrast to the analysis of simple
regression coeﬃcients capturing some contemporaneous impact, the adoption of this criterion
allows for some role for central bank interventions in the medium run. To this aim, we assess
the impact of interventions conducted by the Bundesbank (ECB after the inception of the Euro)
and the Federal Reserve within a noise trading framework, i.e. a model allowing for the presence
of two types of agents, namely chartists and fundamentalists. The noise trading framework has
successfully been applied by authors to explain the discrepancy between the short and long-run
exchange rate dynamics (Allen and Taylor, 1992; De Grauwe and Dewachter, 1993; De Grauwe
and Grimaldi, 2004). It reflects the complex dynamics produced by the interaction of two types of
agents whose existence has been empirically supported by the results of surveys of practitionners
(Cheung and Wong, 2000 for instance).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a model of the foreign exchange
market in which two types of agents, chartists and fundamentalists, interact. We model foreign
exchange market interventions within this model. The main prediction of the model is that ster-
ilized intervention can be eﬀective by making fundamentalist forecasting more profitable thereby
increasing the importance of fundamentalist forecasting. In section 3 we test the prediction of
this model. We first estimate a two-state Markov-switching model allowing for an exchange rate
dynamics consistent with the forecasting rules of the chartists on the one hand and of the fun-
damentalists on the other hand. The role of central bank interventions is introduced through its
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impact on the dynamics of the first order transition probabilities across regimes and hence on the
dynamics of the proportion of each type of agents. Section 4 briefly concludes.
2 The underlying theory
In this section we develop a simple exchange rate model. The model is based on De Grauwe and
Grimaldi(2004). It consists of three building blocks. First, utility maximising agents select their
optimal portfolio using a mean-variance utility framework. Second, these agents make forecasts
about the future exchange rate based on simple but diﬀerent rules. In this second building block
we introduce concepts borrowed from the behavioural finance literature. Third, agents evaluate
these rules ex-post by comparing their risk-adjusted profitability.
2.1 The optimal portfolio
We assume agents of diﬀerent types i depending on their beliefs about the future exchange rate.
Each agent can invest in two assets, a domestic asset and foreign assets. The agents’ expected
utility can be represented by the following equation:
U(W it+1) = E
i
t(W
i
t+1)−
1
2
µV it (W
i
t+1) (1)
where W it+1 is the wealth of agent of type i at time t+ 1, E
i
t is the expectation operator, µ is the
coeﬃcient of risk aversion and V it (W
i
t+1) represents the conditional variance of wealth of agent i.
The wealth is specified as follows:
W it+1 = (1 + r
∗) st+1di,t + (1 + r)
¡
W it − stdi,t
¢
(2)
where r and r∗ are respectively the domestic and the foreign interest rates (which are known with
certainty), st+1 is the exchange rate at time t+1, di,t represents the holdings of the foreign assets
by agent of type i at time t. Thus, the first term on the right-hand side of (2) represents the
value of the foreign portfolio expressed in domestic currency at time t+ 1 while the second term
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represents the value of the domestic portfolio at time t+ 13.
Substituiting equation (2) into (1) and maximising the utility with respect to di,t allows us to
derive the standard optimal holding of foreign assets by agents of type i4 :
di,t =
(1 + r∗)Eit (st+1)− (1 + r) st
µσ2i,t
(3)
where σ2i,t = (1+ r
∗)2V it (st+1). The optimal holding of the foreign asset depends on the expected
excess return (corrected for risk) of the foreign asset. The market demand for foreign assets at
time t is the sum of the individual demands, i.e.:
NX
i=1
ni,tdi,t = Dt (4)
where ni,t is the number of agents of type i.
Market equilibrium implies that the market demand is equal to the market supply Zt. Thus,
Zt = Dt (5)
The market supply is determined by the net current account and by the sales or purchases of
foreign exchange of the central bank. We will assume that the net current account is exogenous.
In section 2.4 we model these sales and purchases by the central bank. Substituting the optimal
holdings (3) into the market demand (4) and then into the market equilibrium equation (5) and
3The model could be interpreted as an asset pricing model with one risky asset (e.g. shares) and a risk free
asset. Equation (2) would then be written as
W it+1 = (st+1 + yt+1) di,t + (1 + r)
¡
W it − stdi,t
¢
where st+1 is the price of the share in t + 1 and yt+1is the
dividend per share in t+ 1.
4If the model is interpreted as an asset pricing model of one risky asset (shares) and a risk free asset, the
corresponding optimal holding of the risky asset becomes
di,t =
Eit (st+1 + yt+1)− (1 + r) st
µσ2i,t
where st+1 and yt+1 are the price and the dividend at t+ 1, respectively, and σ2i,t ≡ V it (st+1 + yt+1).
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solving for the exchange rate st yields the market clearing exchange rate:
st =
µ
1 + r∗
1 + r
¶
1
NP
i=1
wi,t
σ2i,t
"
NX
i=1
wi,t
Eit (st+1)
σ2i,t
− ΩtZt
#
(6)
where wi,t =
ni,t
NP
i=1
ni,t
is the weight (share) of agent i, and Ωt =
µ
(1+r∗)
NP
i=1
ni,t
.
Thus the market clearing exchange rate is determined by the forecasts of the agents, Eit , about
the future exchange rate, their respective weights wi,t and by the net supply of foreign assets Zt.
Note also that the forecasts are weighted by their respective variances σ2i,t. When agent’s i
forecasts have a high variance the weight of this agent in the determination of the market exchange
rate is reduced.
2.2 The forecasting rules
We now specify how agents form their expectations of the future exchange rate and how they
evaluate the risk of their portfolio.
We start with an analysis of the rules agents use in forecasting the exchange rate. We assume
that two types of forecasting rules are used. One is called a “fundamentalist” rule, the other a
“technical trading” rule5. The agents using a fundamentalist rule, the “fundamentalists”, base
their forecast on a comparison between the market and the fundamental exchange rate, i.e. they
forecast the market rate to return to the fundamental rate in the future. In this sense they use
a negative feedback rule that introduces a mean reverting dynamics in the exchange rate. Thus,
the forecasting rule for the fundamentalists is :
Eft (∆st+1) = −ψ
¡
st−1 − s∗t−1
¢
(7)
where s∗t is the fundamental exchange rate at time t , which is assumed to follow a random walk
and 0 < ψ < 1. We assume that the fundamental exchange rate is exogenous.
5The idea of distinguishing between fundamentalist and technical traders rules was first introduced by Frankel
and Froot(1987).
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The timing of the forecasts is important. When fundamentalists forecast the future exchange
rate they use publicly available information up to period t− 1. This implies that fundamentalists
make their forecasts before the market clearing exchange rate st has been revealed to them
6. This
assumption is in the logic of the model used here in which agents do not know the full model
structure. As a result, they cannot compute the market clearing exchange rate of time t that will
be the result of their decisions made in period t7.
The timing assumption underlying the agents’ forecasts in (7) allows us to derive the market
clearing exchange rate in (6) as a unique price for which demand equals supply (see Brock and
Hommes (1998)). An issue that arises here is how this timing assumption can be made consistent
with the optimisation process described in the previous section. There we assumed that when
computing their optimal holdings of foreign assets in period t, agents have information about the
exchange rate in period t. The inconsistency is only apparent. The optimal holdings derived in
equation (3) can be interpreted as a Marshalian demand curve in which an auctioneer announces
a price, st. Agents then decide on their optimal holdings conditioned on this announced price. The
auctioneer then collects the bids and oﬀers, and computes the market clearing price. The latter
is not in the information set of the agents when they make their forecasts for the exchange rate
in period t+ 1.
The chartists are assumed to follow a positive feedback rule, i.e. they extrapolate past move-
ments of the exchange rate into the future. The chartists’ forecast is written as:
Ec,t(∆st+1) = β
∞X
h=1
ρh∆st−h (8)
Here Ec,t is the forecast made by the chartists using information up to time t − 1, and β is the
coeﬃcient expressing the degree with which chartists extrapolate the past change in the exchange
rate; we assume that 0 < β < 1 to ensure dynamic stability. Thus, the chartists compute a moving
average of the past exchange rate changes and they extrapolate these changes into the future
6When we consider agents’ expectations, at time t, of the exchange rate change we define Ei,t(∆st+1) ≡
Ei,t(st+1 − st−1), i = f, c.
7In an environment with fully and perfectly informed agents , agents know the underlying model and are capable
of making such calculations. As a result, in such models agents use information about the exchange rate at time t.
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exchange rate change. We set ρh = [(1− ρ)ρh−1]. Note that this assumption of exponential decay
allows us to rewrite equation (8) as
Ec,t(∆st+1) = ρEc,t−1(∆st) + (1− ρ)β∆st−1 (9)
Thus, technical traders take into account information concerning the fundamental exchange
rate indirectly, i.e. through the exchange rate itself. Note that the same assumption about the
timing of the information set is used here as in the case of fundamentalist forecasting.
We now analyse how fundamentalists and technical traders evaluate the risk of their portfolio.
The risk is measured by the variance terms in equation (6), which we define as the weighted average
of the squared (one period ahead) forecasting errors made by technical traders and fundamentalists,
respectively. Thus we assume σ2i,t = (1 + r
∗)2V it (st+1) where
V it (st+1) =
∞X
k=1
θk
£
Eit−k−1 (st−k)− st−k
¤2
(10)
and where θk = θ(1 − θ)k−1 are geometrically declining weights (0 < θ < 1), and i = f, c. Note
that eq. (10) can be rewritten in the recurrent form
V it (st+1) = θ
£
Eit−2 (st−1)− st−1
¤2
+ (1− θ)V it−1(st) (11)
2.3 Fitness of the rules
The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the fitness of these two forecasting
rules. The general idea that we will follow is that agents use one of the two rules, compare their
(risk adjusted) profitability ex post and then decide whether to keep the rule or switch to the
other one. Thus, our model is in the logic of evolutionary dynamics, in which simple decision rules
are selected. These rules will continue to be followed if they pass some “fitness” test (profitability
test).
9
In order to implement this idea we use an approach proposed by Brock and Hommes(1997)
which consists in making the weights of the forecasting rules a function of the relative profitability
of these rules, i.e. 8:
wc,t =
exp
£
γπ0c,t
¤
exp
£
γπ0c,t
¤
+ exp
h
γπ0f,t
i (12)
wf,t =
exp
h
γπ0f,t
i
exp
£
γπ0c,t
¤
+ exp
h
γπ0f,t
i = 1− wc,t (13)
where π0c,t and π
0
f,t are the risk adjusted net profits computed by technical traders and fundamen-
talists who forecast the exchange rate in period t using information up to t−1, i.e. π0c,t = πc,t−µσ2c,t
and π0f,t = πf,t − µσ2f,t, while πc,t and πf,t are the net profits, to be defined later.
Equations (12) and (13) can be interpreted as switching rules. When the risk adjusted profits of
the technical traders’ rule increases relative to the risk adjusted net profits of the fundamentalists
rule, then the share of agents who switches and uses technical trader rules in period t increases,
and vice versa. This parameter γ measures the intensity with which the technical traders and
fundamentalists revise their forecasting rules. With an increasing γ agents react strongly to
the relative profitability of the rules. In the limit when γ goes to infinity all agents choose the
forecasting rule which proves to be more profitable. When γ is equal to zero agents are insensitive
to the relative profitability of the rules. In the latter case the fraction of technical traders and
fundamentalists is constant and equal to 0.5. Thus, γ is a measure of inertia in the decision to
switch to the more profitable rule.9
We depart from the Brock-Hommes approach in the way we define profits. In Brock-Hommes
profits are defined as the total earnings on the optimal foreign asset holdings. We define the profits
8This specification of the decision rule is often used in discrete choice models. For an application in the market
for diﬀerentiated products see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992). The idea has also been applied in financial
markets, by Brock and Hommes (1998) and by Lux (1998).
9The psychological literature reveals that there is a lot of evidence of a ”status quo bias” in decision making
(see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler(1991). This implies γ < ∞. Thus we set 0 < γ < ∞. Our estimates of the
Markov Switching model in section 3 fully support this conjecture.
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as the one-period earnings of investing $1 in the foreign asset. More formally10,
πi,t = [st−1 (1 + r
∗)− st−2 (1 + r)] sgn
£
(1 + r∗)Eit−2(st−1)− (1 + r)st−2
¤
(14)
Thus, when agents forecasted an increase in the exchange rate and this increase is realized,
their per unit profit is equal to the observed increase in the exchange rate (corrected for the interest
diﬀerential). If instead the exchange rate declines, they make a per unit loss which equals this
decline (because in this case they have bought foreign assets which have declined in price).
Assuming the process of the fundamental exchange rate s∗t as exogenously given, the system of
the dynamic equations (6), (7), (8), (10), (12), (13), (14), some of which are high order equations,
defines a high-dimensional nonlinear discrete-time model. The non-linear structure of the model
does not allow for a simple analytical solution. As a result we have to use numerical simulation
methods. This is done in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2004) with a calibrated version of the model.
These authors show that the model is capable of generating all the empirical ”puzzles” observed
in the foreign exchange market. These empirical puzzles are first and foremost the disconnect
phenomenon (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) who coined the term ”disconnect puzzle”). De
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2004) showed that the model is capable of mimicking this disconnect
puzzle.
2.4 Modelling oﬃcial interventions in the foreign exchange market
The model presented in the previous sections allows for an easy way to introduce the interventions
of the central bank. The supply of foreign assets Zt in equation (6) is determined by the current
account position, i.e. a surplus (deficit) in the current account increases (decreases) the supply of
foreign assets. The supply of foreign assets, however, can also be influenced by the intervention
10where sgn[x] is defined as
sgn[x] =



1 for x > 0
0 for x = 0
−1 for x < 0
and i = c, f
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activities of the central bank. More specifically, when the central bank sells foreign exchange
it increases the supply of foreign assets Zt. This will generally put downward pressure on the
exchange rate. This can also be seen from equation (6): the sign of Zt is negative. Conversely
when the central bank buys foreign exchange it reduces the supply of foreign assets putting upward
pressure on the exchange rate.
It can be useful to analyse the impact eﬀect of a surprise change in foreign assets on the
exchange rate. We obtain this by isolating the eﬀect of a change in Zt in equation (6). Setting
the expectational terms equal to zero, and using the definition of Ωt we obtain
∆st = −
µ
µ
1 + r
¶
1
wc,t
σ2c,t
+
wf,t
σ2f,t
Xt (15)
where Xt = ∆Zt/N, i.e. the supply of foreign assets per capita. As before, we have also
assumed that there are only two types of agents, i.e. chartists and fundamentalists (subscipted by
c and f respectively).
Equation (15) makes clear that the eﬀect of a foreign exchange market intervention on the
exchange rate will be diﬃcult to predict ex ante because it depends on the weights the chartists
and fundamentalists have in the market, together with the forecast errors they have been making
in the past. In other words the eﬀect of interventions will depend on the market structure and the
risk perceptions at the time of the intervention. Since these factors change continuously, the eﬀect
of interventions will also change.
It should also be stressed that we analyze the eﬀects of sterilized interventions here, i.e. inter-
ventions that are not allowed to aﬀect domestic money market conditions, including the domestic
interest rate. Thus we analyse interventions that do not aﬀect the fundamentals. 11
We investigate this question of the eﬀectiveness of interventions assuming a simple intervention
rule. The intervention rule we consider is one in which the central bank is continuously in the
market smoothing the movements of the exchange rate by using a ”leaning against the wind”
11The interventions carried out by the ECB (Bundesbank) and the Fed over the investigated period in the
empirical analysis are reported by the central banks to have been sterelized.
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intervention rule. 12 We specify this rule as follows:
∆Zt = ς(∆st−1) (16)
where ς ≥ 0. Thus when the exchange rate increases (decreases), the central bank sells (buys)
foreign exchange in the market so that the supply of foreign assets increases (decreases). The
parameter ς measures the intensity with which the central bank performs these operations. Note
that as in the case of the private agents the current exchange rate is not in the information set of
the central bank. The current exchange rate is the market clearing exchange rate that will be the
outcome of the decisions of both the private agents and the central bank, but is not yet known
when agents make their decision.
We now implement this simple intervention rule by substituting equation (16) into equation
(6) and solving the model numerically. We show some results of simulating the model in the
time domain in figure (1) using a particular configuration of parameters (In De Grauwe and
Grimaldi(2005) extensive senstitivity analyses are performed). Panel (a) shows the exchange rate
in the absence of any intervention (ς = 0). This is the free float solution It exhibits large movements
of the exchange rate around its fundamental. The next two panels (b) and (c) show the exchange
rate for increasing intensity of intervention. In panel (b) we assume that ς = 0.01 and in panel (c)
we assume that ς = 0.1. We find that as ² is increased the exchange rate is forced to move more
thightly around its fundamental. Thus it appears that this simple rule is capable of reducing the
large disconnnection of the exchange rate from its fundamental in a free float environment. As
a result the application of this rule ensures that the exchange rate better reflects the underlying
fundamental.
The intuition behind this result is that the ”leaning against the wind” strategy of the central
bank reinforces the mean reverting dynamics in the market thereby strenghtening the hand of the
fundamentalists at the expense of the ’trend chasers’ (chartists). This stabilizes the market and
12This leaning-against-the wind type of behaviour has been supported by the estimation of empirical reaction
functions for various central banks. See Almekinders and Eijﬃnger (1995) for the Bundesbank and more recently
Ito (2003) for the Bank of Japan.
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reduces the probability of the emergence of bubbles. Thus the eﬀect of this intervention is that
the exchange rate follows the movements of the underlying fundamentals more closely13.
In order to shed additional light on the question of why a simple intervention rule can be
eﬀective, we show the average weight of the chartists and fundamentalists corresponding to the
three scenarios in Table 1. We see that in the free float simulation the chartists have on average
a weight of 90% in the market (the fundamentalists’ weight is then 10%), while in the scenario
of intense intervention (ς = 0.1) the average weight of the chartists declines to 76% (the average
weight of fundamentalists increases to 24%) Thus when the central bank successfully stabilizes
the exchange rate so that it closely reflects the fundamentals, the fundamentalists on average have
a higher share in the market than when the central bank does not intervene. Put diﬀerently,
systematic interventions by the central bank change the structure of the foreign exchange market,
i.e. they reduce the importance of chartists and increase the importance of fundamentalists. Thus,
the ”leaning agains the wind” intervention rule of the central bank creates an environment in which
the fundamentalists are more active thereby keeping the exchange rate close to its fundamental.
The reason why this is made possible is that the intervention rule increases the mean reversion
forces in the market thereby making fundamentalists forecasting rules more profitable. We show
this in Table 1 where we present the average profits of chartists and fundamentalists in three
scenarios . We find that in the intervention scenarios (ς = 0.01 and ς = 0.1) the fundamentalists
make significantly more profits than in the free float scenario (ς = 0). The reverse is true for the
chartists’ profits. This confirms that the intervention rule of the central bank increases the relative
profitability of fundamentalist forecasting rules, thereby enhancing the position of fundamentalists
in the market14. Thus the stabilizing eﬀect of the intervention rule comes about indirectly, i.e.
it makes fundamentalist forecasting more attractive thereby allowing the market to discover the
fundamental value of the exchange rate more eﬀectively.
Our results are consistent with the signalling channel of foreign exchange market interven-
tions.that has been stressed by Dominguez(1998), Sarno and Taylor(2001) and others. In our
model the interventions signal the central bank’s commitment to avoid too large departures from
13In De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2005) we analysed the target intervention rule as proposed by Williamson and
Miller (1987). The results are very similar to the simple leaning against the wind rule analysed here.
14Note that even in the intervention scenarios, chartism remains more profitable than fundamentalism.
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Figure 1: Simulated exchange rate under intervention rule
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the fundamental exchange rate. This signal has the eﬀect of enhancing the influence of fundamen-
tal variables on the exchange rate.
Mean profits and weights of fundamentalists and chartists
ς = 0 ς = 0.01 ς = 0.1
mean profit fundamentalists 0.0010 0.0045 0.0081
mean weight fundamentalists 0.1 0.13 0.24
mean profit chartists 0.1099 0.0971 0.0888
mean weight chartists 0.9 0.87 0.76
Table 1 : Mean profits and weights of fundamentalists and chartists
along with intervention intensity (ς)
The previous results assume a rule based intervention policy. The question that arises is how
a stochastic intervention by the central bank aﬀects these results. Using the same model as the
one presented here, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005) show that when the central bank intervenes
in a random way, the eﬀects of these interventions on the exchange rate are highly unpredictable.
The reason why they obtain this result can readily be seen from equation (15). A random change
in X has an unpredictable eﬀect on the exchange rate because, as we argued earlier, it depends on
market conditions prevailing at the time of the change in X. As a result, a given sale or purchase
of foreign exchange can have very diﬀerent eﬀects on the exchange rate depending on the volatility
in the market and the share of chartists at the time of the intervention.
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3 The Empirical Investigation
3.1 The basic chartists-fundamentalists model
In this section, we propose an empirical estimation of the impact of interventions, building on
the theoretical framework developed in the previous section. The empirical counterpart of the
theoretical model involves the modelling of chartist and fundamentalist traders whose proportions
are ultimately aﬀected by the occurrence of the central bank interventions. A natural way to
do this is to specify a model with switching proporties between a chartist and a fundamentalist
regimes.
We focus on the dynamics of the USD against the Euro (DEM before 1999) over a long period
ranging from 1985 to 2003. We work at the bi-weekly frequency. On the one hand, the respective
behaviours of the chartists and fundamentalists are clearly identifiable in the medium run (see
Sarno and Taylor, 2002). More precisely, typical chartists rule involve computations of moving
average ranging from 14 to 200 days (see Neely, 2001 for instance). Fundamentalists basically react
to deviations to equilibrium exchange rates which are computed at a macroeconomic frequency.
On the other hand, central bank interventions are carried out at an intradaily frequency (the
central bank typically reacts to short run exchange rate evolutions - see Neely, 2001) and the
oﬃcial data are available on a daily basis. The choice of the bi-weekly frequency for the data
should therefore be seen as a compromise. It more or less matches the frequency that are typically
used in previous estimations of this type of models (Vigfusson, 1997; Manzan and Westerhoﬀ,
2005).
The estimated model is a two-regime Markov switching model. Each regime captures the
behaviour of a particular type of agents trading in the FX market. At this stage, the switch-
ing properties of the model are not investigated further in the sense that the regime transition
probabilities are supposed to be constant over time.15 We denote et as the log of the Euro/USD
exchange rate and we define the (bi-weekly) return as rt = 100 ∗ [ln(et)− ln(et−1)].
In the first regime, the chartist regime, in line with the theoretical model (see equation (8)),
agents are supposed to use only past exchange rate developments to forecast future fluctuations
15We will relax this assumption mater on in section 3.4. when we will consider time-varying transition probabilities
(TVTP).
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of the currencies. The general specification of the chartist regime is given by:
rc,t = C(rt−i) + ²c,t. (17)
where rc,t is the forecasted value of rt by chartists, ²c,t is the error term peculiar to chartists
and C is the general function used by chartists for the purpose of forecasting.
In contrast to chartists, fundamentalists consider the exchange rate as reacting to misalign-
ments of the current exchange rate level with the fundamental equilibrium value. The empirical
specification is fully consistent with the theoretical forecasting rule for fundamentalists (equation
(7)) :
rf,t = −ψ(et−1 − ft−1) + ²f,t. (18)
where rf,t is the forecasted value of rt by fundamentalists, ²f,t is the error term peculiar to
fundamentalists, ψ is the parameter used by fundamentalists to forecast the exchange rate using
the known value of the exchange rate misalignement and ft−1 is the empirical countepart of the
log of s∗t−1 in (7) . Typically, parameter ψ should be negative in this regime to capture a mean
reverting behaviour of the exchange rate towards the fundamental value (depreciation required
to correct overvaluation).16 In the Markov-switching model, the dynamics of the exchange rate
is driven by the value of a latent variable lt that captures whether the prevailing regime is the
chartist one (lt = c) or the fundamentalist one (lt = f). The special insight of the first-order
Markov-switching model is that the dynamics of lt is driven by first-order transition probabilities.
In the basic Markov Switching model (Hamilton, 1989 and 1994 for instance), these transition
probabilities are assumed to be constant over time. In the case of two regimes, these transition
probabilities are defined as :
16Of course, given the fact that the empirical specification slightly deviates from the theoretical model, we relax
the assumption that ψ is comprised between 0 and 1.
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p = Pr ob(lt = c | lt−1 = c) (19)
q = Pr ob(lt = f | lt−1 = f) (20)
In this model, p captures the probability of remaining in the chartist regime from one period
to the other. It is therefore a measure of the persistence of the regime from which it is possible to
compute theoretically the expected number of periods during which the economy will be in this
regime.17 For the sake of the future extension to the case of time-varying transition probabilities
(TVTP), it may be useful to express p and q through a logistic specification of the type :
p = 1− (1 + exp(π0))−1 (21)
q = 1− (1 + exp(κ0))−1 (22)
Notice that if the parameters π0 and κ0 expressed on the logistic scale take both zero values,
then p and q equal 0.5. In this case, the probability of remaining in the regime is equal to
the probability of leaving the regime, suggesting that a Markov-switching approach is rather
inappropriate to capture the dynamics of the exchange rate return. Although these specification
tests may appear rather simple, Hamilton (1996) shows that t-tests applied to the transition
probabilities of the type [pˆ − p0]/σˆpˆ (where p0 denotes the value of p under the null and σˆpˆ the
estimate of the standard error of pˆ) can be trusted, both asymptotically and in finite samples 18.
17Indeed, the respective expected numbers of periods are equal to 1/(1− p) and 1/(1− q).
18Hamilton provides some Monte Carlo analysis for T=50 and T=100, i.e. for much smaller samples sizes than
the ones considered here (T=498). The distributions of these t-statistics in small samples are found however to be
skewed rightward.
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3.2 Preliminary investigation
In order to estimate model (17-19), we first need to tackle two points. The first one is the choice
of an empirical measure of the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate ft that plays an important
role in the definition of the fundamentalist regime. Previous work (Vigfusson, 1997; Manzan and
Westerhoﬀ, 2005) has typically used the PPP value as a measure of the equilibrium exchange
rate. However, while interesting, PPP levels capture only one type of equilibrium and rely on
the relevance of the law of one price. As an alternative, we use here recent estimates of Benassy
et al. (2004) of these equilibrium exchange rates. The specific insight of these estimates is that
they provide levels consistent with a joint equilibrium of all countries included in their sample
(broadly speaking, the OECD countries). Furthemore, the equilibrium value is defined as the one
consistent with external and internal balance of these economies.
We first compute for a given year the value of the nominal equilibrium exchange rate for the
Eurozone in terms of USD from the misalignement values estimated by Be´nassy et al. (2004) using
the average value of the nominal exchange rate over the year. Since we compute misalignment
values at much higher frequencies, we smooth this equilibrium value by interpolation in order to
get rid of the artificial jumps due to changes of the calendar year. We then compute misalignment
levels at the bi-weekly frequency by computing the distance of the (log of) the exchange rate
from (the log of) this smoothed value of the equilibrium.19 Figure 3 plots the evolution of the
smoothed misalignement degree of the Euro against the dollar over the sample period (positive
values refer to Euro undervaluation). From the figure, one can identify two distinct periods of
dollar overvaluation: the first one ranges from the beginning of the sample (January 1985) to the
end of 1986; the second one begins in mid 1998 and persists until the end of the sample (May
2003).
19As for the exchange rate quotation, we use values observed on Fridays at 21.00 GMT+1 physical time. This
choice ensures that interventions conducted by both central banks during the two last weeks occur before the
quotation of the rate, assuming implicitely that these interventions take place on their own local markets. This
assumption is supported by the evidence provided by Dominguez (2004) concerning the timings of the reported
FX. operation
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Figure 3. Misalignement of Euro against the USD (in percents)
The second issue is the exact nature of the C function in the chartist regime (equation(17)).
Chartists are usually reported to use a complex set of moving average rules leading to heteroge-
neous strategies across agents. This heterogeneity makes the identification of the agregate chartist
forecasting rule quite cumbersome. Since chartist behaviour is not directly observable, there is a
large number of admissible specifications for equation (17), which need to be evaluated. The re-
tained specification should be therefore selected on the basis of data adjustment. As a premiminary
check, we have estimated simple AR-GARCH models of the following type:
rt = r0 +
gX
i=1
ρirt−i − λ(et−1 − ft−1) + ²t (23)
σ2t = ω + ϕ²
2
t−1 + ησ
2
t−1.
where rt is the return of the DEM/USD exchange rate, σ
2
t is the conditional variance and
r0, ρi,λ,ω,ϕ and η are parameters to be estimated.
20 We find reasonable evidence of a mean
20In order to save place, we do not report the estimated values for r0, ρi,ω,ϕ and η but these acn be obtained
upon request.
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reverting behaviour of rt towards the equilibrium level with λ equal to a value close to 1.35
and a significance level slightly above 5 percents. We do not find any evidence of significant
autoregressive coeﬃcients for g up to 10. This is hardly surprising given that the model is a single
regime model capturing some mixture of the dynamics between the chartist and the fundamentalist
regimes. Nevertheless, almost all coeﬃcients turn out to be positive, suggesting that agents make
use of extrapolative moving average rules capturing the medium-run evolution of exchange rates.
Replacing the autoregressive part
Pg
i=1 ρirt−i by the past cumulated returns [et−1− et−(p+1)], we
find limited evidence of a positive relationship. In particular, we find that for g = 4, this term
exibits a positive relationship with a p-value slightly above 10 percents. This might suggest that
on average chartists extrapolate returns using a two-months window. We build on this preliminary
evidence to find a suitable specification to equation(17) in the chartist regime.
3.3 The constant transition probabilities case
Based on the preliminary evidence and after testing competing models, the retained specification
for the chartist equation is :
rc,t = α1(et−1 − et−5)1{|rt−1|<
−
b}
+ α2(et−1 − et−5)1{|rt−1|>
−
b}
+ ²c,t (24)
where 1 is the indicator function taking 1 if the condition within brackets is satisfied, 0 otherwise
and
−
b is some constant threshold. In this specification, chartists use past exchange rate trends
defined over the last four periods (last two months) in a non linear way. The extrapolation rate is
diﬀerent whether short run volatility (captured by | rt−1 |) is below or above some threshold. To
measure this threshold
−
b , we choose the average value of | rt−1 | over the entire sample.21 This
specification therefore captures the fact that chartists will behave diﬀerently whether the level of
exchange rate volatility has been relatively high or not.
The Markov-switching regimes are estimated by the Expected Maximum Likelihood (EML)
procedure (see for details Hamilton 1994). Basically, the EML estimation relies on the maximiza-
21Note that given the fact that exchange rate volatility is often clustered over time, | rt−1 | will also proxy the
contemporaneous level of volatility.
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tion of the log-likelihood function
PT
t=1 [Ln(Γ(rt | Θt)] in which Γ is the conditional density of ²t
and Θt the information set at time t. In the EML procedure, the log-likelihood is computed from
the sum of the log-likelihood values conditional upon each regime:
Ln(Γ(rt | Θt)) = (25)
Ln
SX
i=1
SX
j=1
(Γ(rt | Θt, lt = i, lt−1 = j) Pr(lt = i, lt−1 = j | Θt).
It is assumed that Γ is gaussian.22 It should be stressed that for assessing the relevance of the
two-regime model against a one-regime model, the standard conditions are not fulfilled to carry
out the usual likelihood ratio tests (LRT). Several solutions have been proposed (see for instance
Hansen 1992), including the adjustment of critical values proposed by Garcia (1998) for a set of
specific two-regime models. When these adjusted critical values are not available, one has to rely
on auxiliary tests.
22For the estimation of the smoothed probabilities Pr(st = i | Ωt), we rely on the algorithm developped by Kim
(1994).
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(1) (2)
α1 0.018 -
[0.039]
α2 0.987 * 1.007 *
[0.510] [0.529]
β -1.574 ** -1.592 **
[0.785] [0.778]
σ2c 2.583 *** 2.605 ***
[0.235] [0.246]
σ2f 1.658 *** 1.665 ***
[0.161] [0.160]
π0 2.620   *** 2.516 ***
[1.238] [1.214]
κ0 2.687 *** 2.658 ***
[0.916] [0.869]
p 0.932 0.925
[0.078] *** [0.084] ***
q 0.935 0.935
[0.055] *** [0.053] ***
Νobs 981 981
LogLik -1042.93 -1043.03
standard errors of expected maximum likelihood estimates are in brackets.
***, ** and * refer to significance  at 1%, 5% and 10% nominal levels
standard errors of p and q computed with the delta method
Table 2. The basic chartist-fundamentalist model: Euro-USD January 1985- May 2003
Table 2 reports the estimates of the basic chartist-fundamentalist model for two alternative
specifications. Several comments are in order. First, the model estimations clearly identify the
fundamentalist regime. The ψ parameter is significantly positive, suggesting a mean-reverting be-
haviour of et towards its fundamental value ft. This finding is highly robust to alternative specifi-
cations and to the extension of the model to time-varying transition probabilities (see section 3.4).
Second, the model estimates suggest that in the chartist regime, agents tend to extrapolate past
trends only when the short-run volatility is relatively high (α2 > 0). The p-value of this parameter
is slightly above the 5% significance level (p-values of 5.3 and 5.7 percents for respectively specifi-
cation (1) and specification (2)). In contrast, when the level of short-run volatility is historically
low, chartists see the exchange rate as following a random walk: α1 is insignificantly diﬀerent
from zero and is therefore excluded in the second specification (last column in table 1). These
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results suggest that the chartist regime is at best non stabilising for the exchange rate and can be
even destabilizing in relatively turbulent markets. Importantly, the results are consistent with the
theoretical framework in which chartists are supposed to follow a positive feedback rule (equation
(8)). Third, our estimates of the error variances suggest that on average, the chartist regime is
riskier than the fundamental one. Finally, regarding the transition probabilities, the estimates
suggest the existence of a significant degree of persistence within each regime, with probabilities
of remaining in the previous regime amounting to about 0.93 for both types of agents. The ergodic
(long-run) probabilities (implied by the estimates of p and q in specification (1)) amount to 0.498
and 0.502 in respectively the chartist and fundamentalist regimes, suggesting that on average, the
proportion of both type of agents is equal. Of course, this does not rule out periods in which one
regime prevails. Nevertheless, examining the smoothed probabilities that capture the probability
of being in both regimes, we do not find any evidence of proportions of chartists or fundamentalists
equal to 1. For the sake of illustration, the highest proportion of chartists amounts to 0.89. We
find a very small proportion of chartists in the very beginning of the sample (below 0.01) but these
proportions are never equal to zero. In other terms, the model suggests that the dymamics of the
exchange rate is always a mixture of the dynamics intrinsically related to both regimes.
3.4 The role of interventions
3.4.1 The TVTP model
In specification (22-23), the transition probabilities of remaining in a particular regime depend
only on the previous state of the economy (lt−1), i.e. the nature of the regime prevailing during
the previous period. One possibility to capture the impact of exogenous variables is to make these
transition probabilities dependent on these variables. In our analysis, we introduce central bank
interventions that take place during the two preceding weeks. While specific, this extension is con-
sistent with the theoretical model exposed in section 2. Indeed, in the chartists-fundamentalists
framework, the dynamics of the exchange rate is intrinsically related to the proportion of each
type of agents. These proportions depend primarily on the profitability of the respective fore-
casting rules (equations (12) and (13)). In turn, the relative profitabilities are aﬀected by the
occurrence of the central bank interventions in the FX markets. As a result, as suggested by the
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simulation outcomes, the proportions of chartists and fundamentalists are aﬀected by the central
bank purchases and sales of foreign currency. Through the extension to time-varying transition
probabilities that depend on these interventions, our empirical modelling closely reflects the way
the impact of FX interventions is captured in the theoretical model.
To implement the TVTP estimation, we followe Filardo (1994) as well as Diebold, Lee and
Weinbach (1994) and use a logistic specification. In this case, denoting by Ii,t−1 intervention of
type i which has taken place between t − 1 and t and building on equations (21-22), we extend
the chartist-fundamentalist model as :
p = Pr ob(lt = c | lt−1 = c, Ii,t−1) = 1− (1 + exp(π0 +
mP
i=1
πiIi,t−1)
−1. (26)
q = Pr ob(lt = f | lt−1 = f, Ii,t−1) = 1− (1 + exp(κ0 +
mP
i=1
κiIi,t−1)
−1. (27)
The full model is made of equations (18-24-26-27).
3.4.2 CBI Data
The central bank intervention data used in this paper are direct purchases and sales of foreign
currencies carried out by the Fed and the Bundesbank (ECB after the inception of the Euro) over
the period ranging from 1 January 1985 to 31 May 2003. We use daily oﬃcial interventions, i.e.
interventions released by the central banks themselves. These exclude false rumours of interven-
tions. Given the available statistical information, there are several ways through which one can
capture the activity of central banks in the FX markets.
First, one can measure central bank’s activity through the total amounts sold or purchased
on the markets. As an alternative, one can capture the presence of these central banks by either
dummy variables or by the total number of intervention days over the period under investigation.
Here, we disregard the amounts and use the latter approach. There are two basic reasons for which
using total amounts can be misleading. First, these amounts are released with a lag of several
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months (usually between 3 and 6 months) by central banks and news wire reports clearly show
that currency traders do usually a very bad job in estimating the level of currency transactions
from the observation of the flow orders. Second, along the signalling channel, amounts of inter-
ventions should exert a very non linear eﬀect on the reaction of currency traders, which leads to
a cumbersone empirical identification of these eﬀects.23
The second choice regarding the measure of central bank’s activity is whether one should
use perceived rather than oﬃcial interventions. The diﬀerence between these categories gives
the number of secret (i.e. unreported) interventions carried out by the monetary authorities.
In this respect, Beine and Lecourt (2004) propose a new method based on newswire reports to
disentangle oﬃcial interventions into reported (i.e. perceived) operations and secret ones. As
usual in this literature, the decomposition relies on the information available to traders the day
of the intervention. Since we use data at the bi-weekly frequency, such a decomposition might
nevertheless be misleading. Some operations which are unknown to traders the day they were
carried out (and thus classified as secret interventions) might be disclosed a few days later through
rumours or confirmation statements given by oﬃcials. However, using the mere number of oﬃcial
daily intervention days might also be misleading in the sense that the exact number of interventions
over the two previous weeks might also be unknown. As a result, we use two alternative measures.
The first one computes the number of oﬀficial intervention days over the two previous weeks by a
given central bank. The second one uses a dummy variable capturing whether a particular central
banks was active or not in the market during the previous period.
A final point concerns the distinction between concerted and unilateral operations. A substan-
tial number of studies have disentangled the FX operations between unilateral ones (conducted by
a single central bank) and coordinated ones (simultaneous operations of the two central banks in
the same market). This distinction stems from two reasons. First, there is some evidence (Catte et
al., 1994) that coordinated operations might exert diﬀerent impacts from unilateral interventions.
The signalling theory that emphasizes the information content embedded by these operations also
implies such an asymmetric eﬀect. Nevertheless, this distinction has been especially relevant for
studies using high frequency data and it is less clear that such a decomposition is needed when
23See Beine and Szafarz (2004) for an attempt on the YEN/USD market. In contrast to the BoJ interventions,
the daily size of the Fed and the Bundesbank operations does not vary significantly over the investigated period.
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using bi-weekly data. From a statistical point of view, the distinction between concerted and uni-
lateral operations also allows to reduce the observed degree of correlation between the intervention
variables and to reduce the problems of multicollinearity (see Beine et al., 2003 for some extensive
evidence on weekly data). This high degree of correlation is due to the important proportion of
concerted operations observed especially during the first part of the sample. This is particularly
important when measuring central bank activity by the total number of intervention days over
the previous period. As a result, we use two alternative measures of central bank activity. As a
first measure, we use the number of intervention days of both central banks (ECB and the Fed),
whether they are coordinated or not. As a second measure, we disentangle these operations into
unilateral operations of each central bank and concerted operations.
3.5 The results
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the full chartists-fundamentalists model with transition
probabilities depending on the central bank interventions Ii,t−1. In line with the earlier discussion,
each column reports the results obtained with a diﬀerent measure for Ii,t−1. Column (1) reports
the results obtained with central bank activity measured by the total number of intervention days
of the Fed (268 intervention days) and the Bundesbank (318 intervention days), irrespective of
whether they are concerted or unilateral. As expected, given the share of coordinated interventions
(161 intervention days) this results in a high degree of correlation (0.724), which in turn may lead
to imprecise estimates of the impact (π1, π2,κ1 and κ2 coeﬃcients). This degree of correlation
is very much reduced when measuring central bank activity by the number of unilateral and
concerted operations.24 The results specific to this specification are reported in column (2) of
Table 3. Results of column (3) are obtained with the same specification, with the unilateral
Fed interventions excluded to increase eﬃciency. Finally, results of column (4) are obtained with
central bank activity captured by dummies rather than by the number of intervention days over
the previous two-weeks period.25
24The correlation between concerted operations and unilateral Fed interventions (resp. BB interventions) amounts
to 0.286 (resp. 0.391). The correlation between unilateral operations of the Fed and those of the Bundesbank is
equal to 0.131.
25Using this measure, we observe 54, 45 and 62 occurrences for respectively the concerted, the Fed and the
Bundesbank interventions.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
α1 -0.009 0.003 0.006 -0.006
[0.039] [0.030] [0.032] [0.040]
α2 0.800 0.890 ** 0.834 * 0.925 *
[0.535] [0.438] [0.430] [0.504]
β -1.759 *** -1.996 *** -1.972 *** -1.592 **
[0.645] [0.653] [0.652] [0.635]
σ2c 2.699 *** 2.555 *** 2.538 *** 2.723 ***
[0.221] [0.166] [0.154] [0.192]
σ2f 1.812 *** 1.709 *** 1.700 *** 1.775 ***
[0.103] [0.121] [0.122] [0.089]
π0 4.331   *** 3.921  *** 3.966 *** 4.928  ***
[0.767] [0.780] [0.819] [1.087]
π1 [Fed,c] 0.363 -0.071 - 5.093
[0.599] [0.414] [4.934]
π2 [ECB,c] -0.924 ** -0.830 ** -0.891 ** -3.989 ***
[0.439] [0.383] [0.372] [1.453]
π3 [Coord,c] - -0.644 -1.157 -3.809 **
[0.551] [1.064] [1.760]
κ0 6.066 * 4.723 *** 4.784 *** 16.576
[3.212] [1.815] [1.673] [40.207]
κ1 [Fed,f] -2.423 -0.395 - -16.375
[2.005] [0.433] [40.163]
κ2 [ECB,f] -0.086 -1.051 -0.200 -15.247
[0.923] [0.990] [0.682] [40.219]
κ3 [Coord,f] - -1.060 -1.807 -15.078
[0.681] [1.220] [40.211]
Νobs 981 981 981 981
LogLik -1040.35 -1040.13 -1040.68 -1040.13
p-value LRT 0.27 0.47 0.34 0.09
standard errors of expected maximum likelihood estimates are in brackets.
***, ** and * refer to significance  at 1%, 5% and 10% nominal levels
Table 3. FX Interventions in the chartist-fundamentalist model: Euro-USD, January 1985, May
2003.
On the whole, we find that the occurrence of interventions has induced some increase in the
proportion of fundamentalists, especially when these operations took place when the chartist
regime prevailed. Indeed we find some evidence that the transition probability of remaining in the
chartist regime significantly decreases as a result of the occurrence of the FX interventions. This
is the case for the Bundesbank interventions (π2 < 0), regardless of the way they are measured.
We observe the same eﬀect for coordinated interventions when central bank activity is captured
through a single dummy variable (see π3 < 0 in column 4). This may suggest that traders pay
attention to the fact that the central banks were active during the past two weeks rather than
to the pure number of occurrences of this type of operation. 26 Importantly, we do not find any
evidence of some eﬀect of interventions driving the exchange rate towards a value consistent with
26Once more, it should be stressed that traders are not necessarily able to observe the total number of operations
in the short run. This is especially the case during the first part of the sample in which the quality of news wire
services was relatively lower.
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the chartist dynamics. 27
An interesting finding of the analysis concerns the asymmetric eﬀects between unilateral op-
erations of the Fed and the Bundesbank. Indeed, we find evidence in favor of eﬃciency for the
unilateral opertations of the Bundesbank and to a lesser extent the concerted interventions. In
contrast, the unilateral operations of the Fed display weak eﬀects in terms of the dynamics of
chartists and fundamentalists. In the theoretical model, the adoption of an intervention rule that
aims at reducing the degree of misalignement results in higher eﬃciency compared to interven-
tions conducted in a random way. Almekinders and Eiﬃnger (1995) find that the Bundesbank
intervened in reaction to deviations of the exchange rate from a target computed as the mov-
ing average over past values of the exchange rate. To the extent that this target is similar to
the equilibrium exchange rate, this suggests that the Bundesbank did not behave very diﬀerently
compared with the representative central bank in the theoretical model. As for the recent period,
the three unilateral interventions of the ECB in November 2000 took place when the Euro was
obviously undervalued with respect to the dollar. While Almekinders and Eiﬃnger (1995) also
found that the Fed adopted a leaning-against-the-wind policy before 1990, they also document
a stronger reaction of the US authorities to exchange rate volatility. This suggests that the Fed
is less keen to adop a specific intervention rule aiming at reducing the degree of misalignement.
This behaviour was confirmed in the nineties during which the oﬃcial motivation to intervene was
more to react to market disorders.28
To sum up, we find that if there is some eﬀect of these operations at a two-weeks horizon, the
purchases or sales carried out by the central bank tend to push the exchange rate in a direction
consistent with the fundamentals. This can be interpreted to mean that interventions were on
average eﬀective in the medium run. This contrasts with the usual claim that interventions are
not eﬀective (and even counterproductive) since they hardly manage to move the exchange rate
in the intended direction.
27For the central bank interventions taking place when the fundamentalist regime prevails, while negative, the
impact is never significant due to the very high value of uncertainty obtained in the parameter estimation. This is for
instance striking in column 4 of Table 2 (see κ1, κ2 and κ3 parameters). Such a blowing up of the standard deviation
might reflect that very few interventions occur when such a regime prevails, leading to very poor estimations of
these parameters.
28Interestingly, the quaterly report on the Treasury and Federal Reserve foreign exchange operations issued after
the last intervention in 2000 states that the reason to intervene in support of the Euro was the prevailing excess
exchange rate volatility.
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4 Conclusion
This paper aims at revisiting the issue of eﬀectiveness of central bank interventions in the FX
market. As an alternative to what has been used in the literature, we define an eﬀective operation
as the one driving the exchange rate closer to its fundamental value. To this aim, we analyze the
eﬀects of a central bank intervention rule within a theoretical framework capturing the interaction
of the behaviour of chartist and fundamentalist traders in the FX market. The intervention is
found to aﬀect the relative profitability of the strategies developed by both type of agents, leading
to an increase in the proportion of fundamentalist traders and hence a market exchange rate closer
to the fundamental level.
We empirically assess the eﬀectiveness of the interventions and focus on the eﬀects of the op-
erations carried out by the ECB (Bundesbank before the inception of the Euro) and the Federal
Reserve in the Euro/USD market. We test to what extent the occurrence of the central bank inter-
ventions tended to aﬀect the transition probabilities relative to the chartist and the fundamentalist
regime. We find some evidence that in the medium run, the occurrence of some unilateral and to
a lesser extent coordinated interventions led to a decrease in the proportion of chartists. To the
extent that the chartist traders are found to extrapolate past exchange rate movements to forecast
future values, we find that the interventions have the eﬀect of bringing the exchange rate more in
line with a value consistent with the fundamentals in the economy.
We take the view that our criterion of eﬀectiveness of interventions is consistent with the
general objectives pursued by central banks. It abstracts from simple criteria used before like
the contemporaneous impact that can be inconsistent with the medium run goals followed by
monetary authorities. Interestingly, while the bulk of previous studies often concluded against
the eﬀectiveness of the central bank interventions in the short run, our findings tend to give more
support in favour of a reasonable degree of eﬀectiveness in the medium run.
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